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Abstract. This paper looks at recent debates in the enactivist litera-
ture on computation and consciousness in order to assess major obstacles
to building artificial conscious agents. We consider a proposal from Vil-
lalobos and Dewhurst (2018) for enactive computation on the basis of
organizational closure. We attempt to improve the argument by reflecting
on the closed paths through state space taken by finite state automata.
This motivates a defense against Clark’s recent criticisms of “extended
consciousness”, and perhaps a new perspective on living with machines.
Keywords: enactivism, artificial intelligence, computation, Turing ma-
chine, state space, finite state automata, predictive coding, consciousness
1 Introduction
Enactivism challenges the dominant cognitive paradigm in psychology with an
account of intentional (purposive) agency that is grounded in the emergent dy-
namics of biological complexity [15,43,46]. Specifically, enactivism holds that
biological life is characterized by adaptive self-constitution: living systems con-
struct and maintain their own organized structure through their active engage-
ment with a changing world [4,35]. This approach motivates a systematic account
of autonomy [3,33,41,48], intentional agency [17,31], subjective consciousness
[19,28], and identity in complex dynamical systems [5,6], with the promise of a
consistent and unified explanatory framework across the full range of biologi-
cal processes, from the biomechanics of single-celled organisms to ecologies and
societies [18,26,44].
Despite the emphasis on biological complexity, enactivism has from its in-
ception maintained a robust research program investigating artificial intelligence,
artificial life, and robotics (hereafter AI) [1,2,13,16,20,42]. This research aims to
develop models, simulations, and robots that assist in the scientific investigation
of biological complexity and adaptive systems. For instance, AI that exhibits
some dynamically self-organizing behavior might serve as a useful “proof of con-
cept” demonstrating key enactivist principles (see [20] for examples). However,
while robotics research has already felt a significant impact from the embodied
approach [37,38], enactivist AI is often advanced against a backdrop of criticism
directed at “merely” computational or representational explanations [22,23]. As
a founder of enactivism Francisco Varela put it, “This fundamental paradigm of
the digital computer program will not do for biology, nor for AI.” [46]
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A recent set of papers from Villalobos, Dewhurst, Ward and colleagues (here-
after Villalobos) [14,49,50,51] address these historical tensions between enac-
tivism and computation. Villalobos argues that the enactivists are mistaken to
treat computers as mere symbolic processors of abstract representations. Draw-
ing on a mechanist account of computation, Villalobos suggests an interpretation
of the classical Turing machine which they claim would meet enactivist condi-
tions for self-determination. If so, it would suggest that embodied agency could
be given a computational rather than biological basis without sacrificing enac-
tivist commitments to the dynamical interactions between agent and world. This
argument strikes at the foundations of the enactivist program, and threatens to
overturn 20+ years of enactivist thought on AI and computation.
The central concern of this paper is to assess the proposal for enactive com-
putation put forward by Villalobos. Their argument turns on the enactivist in-
terpretation of self-determination in terms of organizational closure. While we
think Villalobos’ examples fail to meet strong enactivist conditions on closure,
we suggest they can be improved through explicit consideration of the structure
of the finite state automata (FSM) that controls a classic Turing machine. This
highlights an important form of closure that is, we argue, more fundamental than
organizational closure: namely, the closed path through state space taken by the
FSM. We claim that computation is fundamentally concerned with the structure
of paths through state space, and that all living organisms can be characterized
by such paths. This result suggests computation as the fundamental basis from
which the enactivist program must emerge. We then consider the implications of
this argument for a particular strand of criticism raised by Clark [10,12] against
enactivist proposals for “extended consciousness” [36]. We conclude with general
thoughts on the implications these arguments have for living with machines.
2 Organizational closure and Turing’s machine
Organizational closure serves as the basis for the enactivist approach to au-
tonomous intentional (purposive) behavior, and names the sense in which bio-
logical organisms are self-determined [3,4,47]. A system is organized when its
constitutive components are arranged into a network of functionally interdepen-
dent processes and constraints [27]. An organization is closed when the oper-
ation of its constitutive components are themselves sufficient for the adaptive
construction and generation of its organized state [35]. Enactivists argue that
organizational closure provides an intrinsic basis for identifying organisms and
their boundaries as unified wholes. Furthermore, enactivists emphasize that or-
ganisms are precariously situated within a dynamic world to which they must
continually adapt in order to maintain an organized state. This precariousness
creates conditions that demand coordinated action from the organism as a whole
in order to maintain its organized state [7]. This gives rise to what enactivists
call adaptive sense-making, which serves as the basis for investigations into con-
sciousness and phenomenology [19,28,43].
Conscious Enactive Computation 3
Beyond its central role in the enactivist theory of autonomous agency, orga-
nizational closure also figures in enactivist criticisms of classical computation1.
Enactivists contrast the closed structure of biological organisms with the open or
linear structure of traditional computing machines [20]. On this view, computers
operate through a sequence of formal operations that transforms symbolic “in-
put” into symbolic “output”. Enactvists claim at least two important differences
between computation and the adaptive self-constitution of biological organisms.
First, computers perform stepwise formal operations on symbolic input, rather
than performing dynamic mechanical operations within a changing world. Sec-
ond, computers don’t “build themselves” in the sense relevant for adaptive self-
constitution, which requires organizational closure. Put simply, computers aren’t
self-determined wholes with a world of their own, and so cannot serve as the in-
trinsic subject of an experience. Instead, computers are artifacts created through
external processes of human design and manufacturing. Such considerations lead
Froese and Ziemke [20] to distinguish the behavioral autonomy characteristic of
certain kinds of self-controlled machines (say, a dishwasher on a timer), from the
constitutive autonomy characteristic of living biological systems.
Villalobos’ argument for enactive computation in [51] is designed to show that
a Turing machine can meet the conditions for self-determination as described by
Maturana (1988) [30]. Here, self-determination is identified with functional clo-
sure. A system has functional closure when its organizational structure forms
closed feedback loops. As an example, Villalobos offers a thermostat regulating
the temperature of a house. The behavior of the thermostat-house system is char-
acterized by a feedback loop between these two components which has a circular
structure and satisfies functional closure. Of course, while the thermostat-house
system “controls itself” with respect to temperature, it is not adaptively self-
constituting in any deeper sense; thermostats and houses don’t build themselves
with their parts alone. Thus, functional closure is not sufficient for organizational
closure of the sort required for constitutive autonomy. Nevertheless, Villalobos
argues this control structure does not connect inputs to outputs through a linear
sequence of symbolic processes, and so is not “open”. It is, they argue, closed
and minimally self-determining in a sense relevant for enactivist theory.
Villalobos then applies this feedback loop model to the classic Turing ma-
chine. Turing [45] proposed a computing machine with three components: a tape
with discrete cells; a read-write head that operates on the tape; and a program
which controls the operation of the head. On the enactivist interpretation, the
tape serves input to the machine and records output from the machine, and the
machine (the head and program) performs formal operations that convert the
former to the latter as a linear process. Against this view Villalobos offer an al-
ternative, inspired by Wells [54] and Piccinini [39,40], that interprets the Turing
1 Enactivists are not universally hostile to computation. Importantly, Mossio et al
[34] render an organizationally closed system in the λ-calculus, and argue that
“there are no conceptual or principled problems in realizing a computer simula-
tion or model of closure.” Such arguments have resulted in a split between radical
anti-computationalists [22] and more traditional versions of enactivism. See [8,53].
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machine in terms of looping interactions between the machine and the tape. This
forms a functionally closed loop, much like the thermostat-house system, which
implies self-determination in the sense that the computer’s state is determined by
the interactions between the machine and the tape. In an analog computer these
constraints might appear as features of the physical mechanisms of the device,
thereby eliminating any symbolic aspect of the computation. Thus, Villalobos
argues, even a classical Turing machine can be understood as purely mechanical
and functionally closed, and so evades the enactivist criticism of computation.
While this argument doesn’t entail that computers are conscious living creatures
of equivalent complexity to biological organisms, it does confront a major hur-
dle within the enactivist literature to treating computing machines as genuinely
purposive agents with a world of their own.
Does Villalobos’ argument succeed? Briefly, no: functional closure alone is not
sufficient for adaptive self-constitution of the sort relevant for intentional agency
or adaptive sense-making. Villalobos’ ‘enactive’ Turing machine is merely be-
haviorally and not constitutively autonomous. While Maturana’s account is in-
fluential, recent work has developed more rigorous constraints on organizational
closure. For instance, Mossio et al. [32,35] present a model of closure which re-
quires that constitutive constraints operate across multiple scales or levels of or-
ganization to achieve closure. While the thermostat-house system is functionally
closed, we might say that closure occurs at a single scale, namely the feedback
loop that controls temperature. At other scales, for instance the internal struc-
ture of the thermostat mechanism, the system is not closed or self-determining.
Similarly, Turing’s machine appears to be functionally closed only at the level of
operations of the head on the tape and nowhere else. Biological systems, on the
other hand, are in some sense self-determining all the way through—or at least
they are self-organized across a range of scales from inter-cellular biochemistry
through geopolitics that covers the breadth of our experiences of a meaningful
world as human agents. A Turing machine might be functionally closed, but it
covers nothing close to the same range of interactivity.
How many levels of organizational constraints are required to distinguish be-
tween behavioral and constitutive autonomy? Mossio’s model suggests at least
two. If so, Villalobos’ argument might be improved by describing a Turing ma-
chine with two layers of self-determining organizational constraints rather than
one. In the next section, I will discuss how the classic Turing machine already
captures organizational closure across two layers of constraint.
3 Closed paths through state space
If we suspend the anti-representational commitments of enactivism for a mo-
ment, there’s an important feature of Turing’s machine which is not explicitly
addressed in these arguments: the structure of the program which controls the
read-write head. In Turing’s model, the program takes the form of a finite state
machine (FSM). FSMs are abstract automata that are characterized by a fi-
nite number of discrete states, and a set of rules that describe the operations
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performed in each state, and the conditions for transitioning between states,
depending on what is read from the tape. These rules can be represented as a
state transition table, which can be realized2 in a physical machine in a number
of ways. The physical Turing machine is ‘programmed’ insofar as it realizes the
abstract state transition structure of the FSM.
The abstract nature of the FSM should not worry enactivists [27]. An FSM
can in principle be realized by simple physical mechanisms; there’s nothing in-
herently “symbolic” about the FSM. The FSM does not directly concern the
relationship between a computer and its environment; the FSM is not (neces-
sarily) used by a computer to represent the world. The FSM is just an abstract
model of the states a machine can be in, and the conditions for transitioning
between these states. Enactivist literature is often directly preoccupied with
systems being in certain states, like the equilibrium state (homeostasis), and
with the activities organisms must perform to maintain these states [25,41]. To
this extent, enactivist theory depends on state abstractions of the same sort
used to describe the FSM. Describing the autonomy of an organism in terms of
“organizational closure” is already to appeal to an abstract control structure,
so there should be no principled objections from enactivists to discussing the
equally abstract structure of the FSM.
While the FSM can be represented as a transition table, it is also customary
to represent an FSM with a state space diagram with states represented as cir-
cles, and arrows between circles representing the transitions between states. A
state space diagram has a closed path (or loop) if some sequence of operations will
return the system to a previous state. For instance, suppose I take water at room
temperature, freeze it to ice, then let it thaw back to room temperature. The
water changed state, then changed back; we can represent this as a short path
through the state space of water that loops back to where it began. Homeostasis
is an interesting state for biological organisms precisely because they maintain
the state as a fixed point attractor, returning to equilibrium after minor distur-
bances. This is another way of saying that homeostasis is characterized by a
closed path in state space (CPSS).
With these considerations in mind, we propose that CPSSs, and paths in
state space generally, are of fundamental relevance to enactivist models of self-
determination. Moreover, CPSSs put computers and organisms on equal onto-
logical footing. Recall the theoretical motivation for appealing to organizational
closure to explain autonomy: it provides an intrinsic basis for individuating a
system as a unified whole, and so serves as a basis for adaptive sense-making.
We claim that a CPSS accomplishes the same theoretical task: organisms can
2 For historical reasons originating with Putnam [21], it is often taken for granted
that a definition of computation in terms of finite state automata cannot distinguish
between different realizations of a computer, and so cannot in principle provide an
explanation for cognitive behavior. Piccinini [39] cites this as an explicit motivation
for developing his mechanistic account of computation. There are good reasons for
thinking that Putnam’s concerns are overstated [9,24], but this issue is beyond the
scope of this paper. Thanks to Jon Lawhead for pointing this out.
6 Estrada
be identified intrinsically as the collection of processes and constraints that walk
a CPSS. This definition is intrinsic in the same sense as organizational closure:
whether a path counts as “closed” is set by the constitution of the system itself.
More strongly, we claim that any organizationally closed system can be char-
acterized by a collections of CPSSs with a fixed attractor at the constitutive
organized state. This suggests that CPSSs are theoretically a more fundamen-
tal form of closure than organizational closure. Indeed, the important sense of
‘closure’ captured by the enactivists has less to do with daisy-chained functions
looping on themselves, and more to do with the CPSSs those functional rela-
tionships enable. Strictly speaking, neither functional nor organizational closure
is necessary for walking a CPSS.
Not every Turing machine will walk a CPSS, but it is exceedingly common
for them to do so3. We can think of the CPSSs which characterize a Turing
machine’s program as another scale of closure, one which directly controls the
looping interactions between head and tape. With two scales of closed loops,
this would appear to meet Mossio’s stronger constraints on closure, and thus we
have shown the classical Turing machine might already constitute an adaptively
self-constituting system on enactivist grounds. Or, perhaps more realistically, the
depth of closure matters a lot less than what states those functional relationships
(closed, shallow, or otherwise) make available for the organism as it walks paths
in state space.
4 Extended consciousness
To appreciate how CPSSs can be useful to enactivism, consider a recent debate
on the bounds of consciousness. Despite his strong influence on enactivism, Clark
has pushed back against attempts to locate the processes constitutive of con-
scious experience in the world [10]. Clark argues there is no good reason to do
so; the activity constitutive of a conscious experience occurs immediately within
patterns of neural firings. Clark advocates for an explanatory approach called
”predictive coding” which uses “a hierarchical generative model that aims to
minimize prediction error within a bidirectional cascade of cortical processing”
[12]. Clark argues that the model works by rapidly updating on the basis of
new information. This leaves little bandwidth for external changes to impact
the updating model beyond sensory input; the dominant influence on a neuron
is simply the activity of other neurons. Thus, Clark argues, it is unlikely that
external processes play a constitutive role in conscious experience.
Ward [52] offers a response to Clark on behalf of enactivists that appeals
to multiple layers of interactions between the agent and world. Clark’s mistake,
on this view, is to localize consciousness to any single process in the organized
hierarchy. The appeal to multiple layers should by now be a familiar enactivist
move, one Clark rejects as superfluous in this case [11]. Whatever world-involving
3 The question of deciding in general whether a path in state space will close is formally
equivalent to the halting problem, and so is not computable. See [29].
Conscious Enactive Computation 7
processes enactivists believe are important, Clark claims he can account for them
with predictive coding. So consciousness appears stuck in the head.
Clark’s alternative doesn’t appeal to enactivists because the world-involving
aspects of predictive coding appear linear and open, like a computer, rather
than closed like an organism. This isn’t an accurate perception; the cascade of
neural activity develops with looping feedback until the neurons reach stability,
so there are functionally closed processes; those processes just aren’t extended
and world-involving. They only involve neurons and their cortical support. Enac-
tivists are attracted to externalism because they view consciousness as inherently
world-involving and organizationally closed. Just as with Villalobos’ computer,
enactivists are hoping to find closure in the organizational structure of the em-
bodied conscious state. Since closure is an indicator of unification and wholeness,
enactivists expect neural activity and world-involving processes to demonstrate
functional interdependencies. Clark’s argument that the neural activity is not
functionally dependent on external processes is therefore fatal to the view.
Perhaps CPSSs can help resolve this conflict amicably? If we think about
closure in terms of CPSSs we can recover the looping interactions that are in-
herently world-involving and closed in state space, while conceding to Clark that
the neural activity is sufficiently explanatory of the functional interactions that
give rise to the conscious state. In state space we are no longer confined to a
single closed loop spanning organizational levels. Instead, our dynamical activity
across different scales will form many different kinds of closed paths in different
state spaces. Some of these CPSSs will be characterized by inherently world-
involving states, and so will recover an enactivist sense of closure compatible
with predictive coding.
Consider, for instance, that it is easier to maintain your balance with your
eyes open than closed. Here we have two cortical cascades: one producing visual
experiences, and one producing motor activity to maintain balance. These two
systems reinforce each other. Maintaining balance is a precarious state that in-
herently involves the configuration of the body as a massive physical object with
specific dimensions. Thus, the configuration of my body is a fundamental factor
in whether I am in a balanced state. The balanced state is a fixed attractor for
certain CPSSs that characterize my attempts to stay balanced. This brings in
looping, inherently world-involving processes into an explanation of my behav-
ior as an agent without committing to implausible functional interdependencies
between neurons and world. The important dependencies for closure, and ulti-
mately for autonomy, identity, and consciousness, are found in state space.
5 Conclusion
We don’t view CPSSs as a threat to enactivism’s positive theory of autonomy or
adaptive sense-making. Instead, we see it correcting the over-emphasized anti-
computationalism that has historically motivated the view. We think enough
speaks in favor of the enactive approach that it needn’t appeal to a questionable
and increasing problematic ontological distinction between computing machines
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and biological life. Insofar as Villalobos’ argument also serves these goals, this
paper is meant to push harder in the same direction.
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